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NOTES

as forfeits may lead to results not envisaged by the parties. Although French courts apply earnest money to unexecuted sales
and Louisiana has restricted its application to contracts to sell,
the results reached under both systems are for all practical purposes identical. Under neither system would a deposit constitute
earnest money after the sale has been executed by delivery. In
France, earnest money is applicable to perfected sales of both
movables and immovables, although a sale may be perfected
before delivery has been made or the price paid. 19 In Louisiana,
however, a sale of an immovable is not perfected until an act
translative of title is executed, 20 at which time delivery takes
place.2 1 In France, delivery of an immovable is accomplished by
delivery of the title papers. 22 Therefore, earnest money applies
in France until delivery, although the sale may have been perfected before, and it applies in Louisiana until delivery although
the sale will not be perfected before. The question of the application of earnest money to contracts involving movable property
should not depend on whether the transaction constitutes a sale
or a contract to sell, but on whether the contract has been executed by delivery. A forfeit is given as an alternative to performance, and when performance is rendered, the election is made.
Therefore, when the transaction has been completed by delivery,
there is no basis for the court to conclude that a payment was
intended as a forfeit.
William C. Hollier

INSURANcE-AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY-INTERPRETATION
OF TERM "EACH ACCIDENT"

Defendant's negligently driven truck collided with a freight
train and damaged sixteen boxcars belonging to fourteen separate owners. The railroad company, on its own behalf and
presumably acting under assignments in its favor, brought suit
against the defendant. Defendant's automobile liability insurance
policy limited the insurer's liability for bodily injury to each
person to $100,000, to $300,000 for each occurrence, and for prop19. See note 12 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. Art. 2479, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Succession of Curtis, 156 La. 243, 100
So. 412 (1924); Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 966 (1878); Laurans v. Garnier,
10 Rob. 425 (La. 1845); Lallande v. Lee, 9 Rob. 514 (La. 1845); Greco v. Millano, 13 Orl. App. 134 (La. App. 1916).
22. CODE CIVIL art. 1605.
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erty damage in each accident to $5,000. In a settlement with the
railroad company for a total amount of $30,000, the insurer contributed $5,000 and the insured, $25,000, without prejudice to his
right against the insurer. Insured sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The insured
contended that damage to the property of each owner constituted
a separate "accident" under the policy, while the insurer insisted
that there had been but one accident and that its total liability
was limited to $5,000. From a judgment for the insured of
$25,000 in the district court, the insurer appealed. On appeal,
held, affirmed. The property damage suffered by each owner
must be deemed a separate "accident" under the present policy
and the insurer is liable for $25,000. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Rutland, 217 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1954), rehearing
granted, March 22, 1955.
The typical automobile liability insurance policy contains
three types of limitations on the insurer's liability. First, his
liability is limited to a certain amount for injury or death suffered by any one person; second, it is limited to a certain amount
for the injury or death arising out of "each accident"; and third,
it is limited to a certain amount for the damage to property
arising out of "each accident."' Since these limitations are
usually for different amounts, the meaning of the term "each
accident" often becomes of paramount importance. Some indication of its meaning may be obtained from the policy itself. Thus,
the term "each accident" employed in the second limitation
cannot refer to the injury of each person as an "accident," since
the insurer's liability for injury to each person is already provided in the first limitation. Instead the term must refer, as the
courts have uniformly held, to the event out of which injury
arises, regardless of the number of persons injured. 2 Since the
identical term, "each accident," is employed in defining the limit
of liability for property damage, it would seem difficult to avoid
the conclusion that that limit refers only to the total property
damage arising out of a given event, regardless of the number
1. COUGHLIN, YOU AND YOUR CAR INSURANCE 25 (1954); PATTERSON, CASES
ON INSURANCE 801 (3d ed. 1955).
2. Gaines v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 32 So.2d 633 (La. App. 1947);
Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1154, 1158 (1944); cf. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605(c) 4 (Supp. 1951), providing minimum of "not
less than $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons
in any one accident."
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of property owners suffering lossA Some insurance policies
state these limits of liability in terms of "each occurrence" instead of "each accident." The purpose of doing so seems clear.
The term "accident" in liability insurance policies has usually
been interpreted as excluding events intentionally caused by the
insured. 4 The term "occurrence," on the other hand, is broad
enough to include intentionally caused events as well as strictly
accidental happenings. 5 As a result, automobile insurance against
liability arising from "accidents" would not cover liability arising from the intentional -damaging of another vehicle," whereas
insurance against liability arising from "occurrences" would. 7
In other respects, however, there seems to be no difference between the terms "each accident" and "each occurrence" as used
in the limitation clauses of liability insurance policies.
The policy in the present case, unlike most, contained the
expression "each occ'urrence" in the clause limiting the insurer's
liability for bodily injuries, and the term "each accident" in the
clause limiting the insurer's liability for property damage. The
question presented was whether the limits of the insurer's
liability for property damage applied to the aggregate of
property damage arising from the collision, regardless of the
number of property owners suffering loss, or whether they applied to the property damage suffered by each separate owner.
Had the term "each accident" been employed in both the bodily
injury clause and the property damage clause, there seems to be
3. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hart, 153 Fla. 840, 16 So.2d 118 (1943).

See Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055 (1926).
Insured's automobile struck another causing the second car to damage a
third. The court held: "There is, as a general rule, but one accident, even
though there be several resultant injuries or losses." The court went on to
say, "It would no more be correct to say of such a case that there were
two accidents than it would be to predicate two or more accidents on a

general freight train wreck, merely because two or more cars in the train
might have been demolished in the same catastrophe." Id. at 350, 246 Pac.
at 1057.
4. See, generally, 5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 4136 et seq.
(1954). See also Annot., 117 A.L.R. 1175 (1938) (accident as including negligence but excluding intentional injuries); Annots., 111 A.L.R. 1043 (1937),
173 A.L.R. 503 (1948) (wilful and wanton negligence included in accident);
Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1954) (can assault be termed accident?); Annot.,
24 A.L.R.2d 1454 (1952).
5. Chinn v. Butcher's Mut. Cas. Co., 190 Misc. 117, 71 N.Y.S.2d 70 (City
Ct. N.Y. 1947); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marr, 98 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1938);
Springfield Township v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 361 Pa. 461, 64 A.2d 761 (1949).
6. Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 64 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1954).

7. Some indication that the purpose of using the term "occurrence" is to
broaden the type of events covered by the policy is the fact that some
insurance companies advertise that they insure on an "occurrence" instead
of an "accident" basis.
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no doubt that the court would have limited the coverage of the
policy to the liability arising from the collision, regardless of
the number of claimants, to the extent of the insurer's liability
for property damage arising from "each accident." But the use
of the terms "each occurrence" and "each accident" in consecutive clauses was found confusing by the court. It applied the rule
that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured' and
found additional support for deciding in favor of the insured in
the old doctrine that accidents must be looked at from the eyes
of the injured party.9 The court therefore concluded that the
train wreck was at least fourteen accidents under the clause in
the policy that limited the insurer's liability to a certain amount
for property damage arising out of "each accident."
While it may be sound to view accidents from the standpoint
of the injured party when he is claiming as the insured under an
accident insurance policy, the propriety of applying this principle
to automobile liability insurance is questionable. Furthermore,
there was probably no need for applying it in the instant case,
since the ambiguity in the policy is completely dissipated when
it is recognized that the term "each accident" is generally employed for the purpose of covering non-accidental events. The
intriguing and regrettable facet of the decision is that the insurance company's intention of extending its liability to non-accidental injuries had the effect of completely removing, for all
practical purposes, the limitation on its liability for accidental
see
8. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 809 (3d ed. 1951). But
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 166 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1948)
(favoring the insured should only serve to tip the scale when other aids to
interpretation are in equipoise); Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483 (1947) (while ambiguous clauses in insurance policies
should not be permitted to serve as traps for policyholders, policy provisions,
clearly and definitely set forth in appropriate language and constituting
bases for insurer's calculations, should be maintained unimpaired by loose

and ill-considered interpretations).
9. The court relied on Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1949) (for purposes of a policy limiting liability for aggregate damage
and for "each accident," an oil well blowing out for 50 hours and damaging
separate properties as the wind shifted, was held to be a series of accidents);
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Newsome, 147 Ga. 608, 95 S.E. 4 (1918) (where insured

attacked another who then killed the insured, there was an accidental death
for purposes of a life insurance policy); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wyness, 107
Ga. 584, 34 S.E. 113 (1899) (where the injury is not unforeseen by the injured

party, it is accidental as to him although it was purposefully inflicted by
the other party); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jennings, 61 Ga. App. 557, 6
S.E.2d 431 (1939) (where insured attacked another who then killed the in-

sured, there was an accidental death for purposes of a life insurance policy);
South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness and Accident Assurance Ass'n,
[1891] 1 Q.B. 402 (trolley car overturned, injuring many passengers; for pur-

poses of the particular policy each injury was considered a separate accident).
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property damage. The decision indicates that it is inadvisable to
use the terms "each occurrence" and "each accident" in the same
policy without some thorough explanation of the meaning intended.
Harry R. Sachse

LOUISIANA PRACTIcE-ANNULMENT DECREE-DEOLUTIVE APPEAL
AFTER DISMISSAL OF SUSPENSIVE APPEAL
Defendant was granted a suspensive appeal from a judgment by the district court annulling her marriage with plaintiff.
The plaintiff later filed a motion in the district court to have the
appeal dismissed on the ground that the order did not fix a
bond for the appeal and that the defendant had not filed a
bond within ten days after the judgment was signed. The
district judge amended the suspensive appeal order and fixed
the amount of the appeal bond, which was filed by the defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion before the Supreme Court to dismiss the suspensive appeal on the ground that the bond was not
filed within ten days after the signing of the lower court judgment. Held, appeal dismissed as suspensive but maintained as
devolutive. Ramizest v. Ramizest, 77 So.2d 733 (La. 1955).
Article 573 of the Code of Practice prohibits a devolutive
appeal in cases where the judgment decrees a divorce. Since
there is no statutory provision prohibiting a devolutive appeal
from an annulment decree, the court in the instant case was
left with no alternative to granting the appeal. However, by dismissing the suspensive appeal to the decree annulling the marriage, the court left the parties free to enter into new marriages
with third parties. If they did so pending the final decision on
appeal, and the court reversed the annulment decree, numerous
questions could arise as to the status of all parties concerned
and the status of their children, if any were conceived during
that time. These problems were perhaps contemplated when it
was provided in article 573 of the Code of Practice that no devolutive appeal is allowed from a divorce decree. An amendment
to this article to include judgments decreeing the annulment of
marriages would fill the lacuna that presently exists in the law.
John M. Shaw

